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236 PEOl'I,E 1.'. R.IGNEY [55 C.2d 
[Crim. No. GG73. In Bnnk. Jan. 27, 1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LOUIS FREDRICK 
RIGNEY, Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses-Examination by Court.-A trial judge may examine 
witnesses to elicit or c1nrify testimony. 
[2] Criminal Law-Course and Conduct of Trial.-It is the right 
and duty of a judge to eonduet a trial in such manner that the 
truth will be established in accordance with the rules of evi-
dence. 
[3] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-The trial judge must not become an 
advocate for either party or, under the guise of examining wit-
nesse~, C01l1lllent on the evidence or cast aspersions or ridicule 
on n witness. 
[4] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-A judge lIIust not defeat the purpose 
of Pen. Code, § 1122, and Code Civ. Proc., § 611, providing that 
he must admonish the jury not to form or express any opinions 
on any subject connected with the trial until the ease is finally 
submitted to them, by comment on the evidence during the 
trial, but must also keep an open mind until he has had an 
opportunity to hear nIl the evidenee. 
[5] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-Comment by the judge during the 
trial should be expressly labeled as his opinion and the jury 
advised that it may be disregarded; questions are 110t so labeled 
and, when they convey the judge's opinion of the credibility 
of a witness, there is grave danger not only that they may 
induce the jury to form an opinion before the case is finally 
submitted to them, but that the jury will substitute the judge's 
opinion for their own. 
[6] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-The judge may not ask questions to 
eonvey to the jury his opinion of the credibility of a witness 
or intervene so extensively in behalf of the proseeutor as to 
align himself with the prosecutor in the minds of the jury. 
[7] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-The mere 
fact that the judge examined It witness at some length does 
not establish misconduct. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 76; Am. Jur. , Witnesses, § 557. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 385 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 74 et 
seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, ~ 92; [2] Criminal Law, 
~ 1075; [3-G. 10] ('I'illlino] Law. ~ 3~S; [7-9, 11, 12] Crimina] 
Law. ~ 3~7; [13] Jury. * Ill; [1-11 .Jury, * 102(1); [15] Homicide, 
~ 281(3); [16] Homicio\', \\ ::!Sl; [Ii} TIolldei<1t', § 284; [18] Homi. 
cide, § 284(1); [19] Criminnl Law, § 933. 
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[8] ld.-Conduct of Ju(lge-Questioning Witnesses.---Jt is offli-
narily better praetire for a trial jnt1i-ie to let counsel develop 
the case, and to undl'l"takc the eX:lJllination of witnesses only 
when it appears that 1'C'IC'vant :llIrllllnterinl te~timony will not 
be eliciti'll by eOllll~(,1. 
[9] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-Even if testi-
mony elicited by the judge'S questions would probably have 
been elicited byeoun~el, that bet alone docs IIOt render the 
judge's questions improper. 
[10] ld.-Conduct of Judge.-There was nothing improper in the 
judge's candidly advising counsel in chambers of his disbelief 
in defendant's evidence. 
[11] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-There was 
nothing improper in the judge's questiouing witnesses to in-
duce the jury to share the judge's di~belief in defendant's evi-
dence if his questions were designed, as he stated in a con-
ference with counsel in chamhers, to bring out all the facts 
that bore on the suhject fnil'ly nnJ impartinllyto the end that 
justice might be approximated as closely as might be by the 
jury. 
[12] ld.-Conduct of Judge-Questioning Witnesses.-In a prose-
cution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit 
murder, wherein defendant testified that he did .not remember 
going to his room and getting his gun hefore the alleged as-
sault, questions asked defendant by the judge were de-
signed to distinguish clearly the facts defendant remembered 
and those he did not remember and to clarify inconsistencies 
between his testimony and his previous statement to his naval 
superiors, and questions the judge asked a doctor connected 
with a naval hospital were designed to get a full explanation 
of the nature and causes of retrograde amnesia, and werc 
not a guise for conveying to the jury the court's disbelief in 
defendant's evidence but were asked to get the truth estah-
lished, fairly and impartially brought out relevant and material 
testimony, and were not improper, where the judge instructed 
the jury that any intimatIon in his questions or the questions 
of counsel that certain facts were or were not true must be 
disregarded, and that the jury were the exclusive judges of 
the effect and value of the evidence. 
[13] Jury-Challenges-Peremptory.-A juror may not be ex-
amined on 'Voir dire solely for the purpose of laying the founda-
tion for a peremptory challenge. 
[14] Id.-Challenges-For Cause-Voir Dire.-If special circum-
stances made defcndant's questions asked prospective jurors 
on voir dire, apparently designed to obtain information for 
[13] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Jury, § 122 et seq.; Am.Jur., Jury, § 107. 
238 PEOPLE v. RIGNEY 
percmptory clJallcn;,;es, relevant to show bias or other grolllH\" 
for challenge for cause, he ~hou\d have informe,l the court of 
his reasons for asking the 'juestions. 
[15] Homicide-Assault With Intent to Commit :rvIurder-Evidence 
-Threats.-Ill a prosecution for assault wit h a deadly wen pOll 
with intent to eOlllmit murder, it was not error for the eonrt to 
rule out of order a question designed to estahlish thnt the vie-
tim threatened to "tenr [defem1nnt] npnrt" where defendn!lt 
did not hear the threat and where, at the tillle the question was 
asked, there was no evidence that the victim Illay have been 
the aggressor or that defendant was Mtlng in self-dcfensl'. 
Evidence of an uncollllllunicated threat is proper only after a 
foundation has been lnid tending to show that the victim W:IS 
the aggressor, and the question was not rcasked after such 
foundation had been laid. 
[16] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Evidence.-In 
a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 
eOlllmit murder, there was no llU·rit to defendant's contention 
that the court erred in ruling out of order a question designed 
to elicit the ,'ietim's tone of ,oicc , .. hen he stated that he was 
coming out to see defendant where, after the question was 
asked, the court stated that the victim's tone of voice was 
irrelevant, but the answer to the question, thnt the victim's 
tone was "harsh," was not struck and remained in the record 
for the jury's consideration. 
[17] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Instructions.-
In a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to murder a friend of defendant's wife after their interlocu-
tory divorce, where there was evidence that defendant contem-
plated the use of force to visit his child, the court properly 
instructed the jury that defendant did not have the right to 
use force, and it was proper to refuse defendant's proposed 
instruction that defendant had a right to visit the child, but 
which failed to state that he could not use force to do so, 
[18] Id.-Assault With Intent to Commit Murder-Instructions.-
In a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to commit murder, the court did not err, on the jury's request 
for further instructions on intent and transfer of intent, in 
repeating the instructions on transferred intent and in using-
examples in which members of the jury were parties and re-
ferring to the foreman as ")Iy friend," where the court's 
earlier instructions fully and adequately instructed the jury on 
the law of intent and the foreman indicated that the repeat('d 
instructions answered the question asked by the jury. 
[19] Criminal Law - Verdict - Recordation.-Pen. Code, § 1164, 
relating to recordation of verdict and proceeding-s on disagree-
ment of jurors, does not preclude the jury's making a separate 
return of its verdict on each count when more than one count 
) 
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is chargeu. PI'n. Code, § Uj·l, expressly vests in the court the 
power to hnve ;;ep:lratc (,OUllts tried sepa1'lltely, and thefe is no 
reason why the COl11't should not have the jury's verdicts 011 
each count returneu separately. 
APPEATJ from a judgment of the Sup<'rior Conrt of San 
Diego County amI from all orller denying a new trial. E<lgar 
B. Hervey, Judgc. Affirll1<,d, 
Prosecution for assalilt with a Il.'adly wcapon with int('llt 
to eommit murder. Judgment of eonviction of assault with a 
deadly weapoll, anu of as~allit with a deadly weapon with 
intent to commit mUl'del', affirmell. 
Newberry & Prallte and Staffoi'll \V, Praute for ApI)ellant. 
Stanley Mosk, AttOl'lH'Y General, \Villiam E .• James, As-
sistant Attorney General, allll Philip C, Griffin, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defemlant appeals from a judgment en-
tered· on a jury verdict convieting him of two counts of 
assault with a deadly weapon and one count of assault with a 
deadly weapon with intent to commit murder. 
Defendant, a hospital corpsman in the United States Navy, 
was married to Janet Rigney, one of the prosecuting wit-
nesses. Janet secured au interlocutory decree of divorce in 
July 1958. The decree awarded her custody of their infant 
daughter and gave defendant the right of reasonable visita-
tion. He customarily visited the child one afternoon each 
weekend at a San Diego hotel where Janet '8 father resided. 
On the afternoon of Saturday, October 11, 1958, defendant 
arrived at the hotel to visit the child, but Janet bad failed 
to bring her. After the time for the visit had elapsed, defend-
ant drove to Janet's apartment in La Mesa, arriving there 
between 4 :30 and 5. He found the front screen door locked 
and remained outside. Janet and Gaither Charles Brown met 
him at the door. Brown said that he had heard that defend-
ant had been looking for him and asked if defen.iant wanted 
to see him, Defendant replied, "No, I don't care what you 
do; I came over to see the baby." He then asked Janet why 
she had not brought their daughter to the hotel. .Janet replied 
that defendant had told her the previous week that he was 
not going to be in San Diego Saturday and defendant said 
she knew that was not true. He then asked if he could come 
) 
J 
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the following day. Janet said that she and Brown had olhl'l' 
plans, Defendant tUl'lled to leave, aud Bt'own followed hilll 
out to the gate. DefenJant testified that BI'OWll told hilll to 
"ls]tayaway from Jan and 1"ynn lthe baby]. If you wallt 
to see anyone, come alld sce me." Brown denied saying any-
thing. 
Defcnllaut I'ctul'1led to San Diego. There is evidence that 
he had two or three mal·tillis, went to his hotel room and got 
his pistol, and dl'ove back to his wife's apartment, arriving 
there about 6 p.m. lIe walked to the locked ~(Jreen door and 
said: "Tell Chuck [Brown] I changed my mind. I'd like 
to see him outside." The prosecutioll's witness testified that 
Janet called out" Rigs is back." Browll came from the bath-
room, holding a glass and cat'rying his coat. He tossed the coal 
to his daughter Sharon and her friend Lynette, who dropped 
it, and handed the glass to Sharon, who dropped it, aud it 
broke, As Brown approached the door, defendant drew hi!'! 
pistol and fired two shots, Browll flattened himself against 
the wall to the left of the door. Defendant fired two more 
shots, wounding Janet and Sharon. Brown looked otit the 
door and sa,v defendant fumbling with the pistol. Brown 
jumped out, grabbed the pistol, and the two men scuffied. 
They entered the apartment where the pistol again discharged, 
. wounding defendant in the left arm and shoulder. Brown aud 
defendant continued the struggle and rolled outside. Brown 
seized the pistol aud threw it into the nearby swimming pool. 
The police arrived shortly thereafter. 
Defendant testified that his memory was impaired as to 
all events after his return to San Diego. He remembered 
drinking one single and one double martini and upon reaching 
his wife's apartment the second time seeing Brown suddenly 
appear at the screen door, jump to the side of the door and 
reach for his hip pocket. He did not remember going to his 
room and getting his gun. He did remember, however, that 
he had no intent to kill anyone and that he armed himself to 
prevent a fight with Brown. He testified that he remembered 
only isolated events after seeing Brown reach for his hip 
pocket and that he did not remember firing the gun. 
Defendant contended throughout the trial that he did not 
form the specific intent to commit murder. His description 
of his state of mind during the period between his first depar-
ture from his wife's apartment and the moment he ceased firing 
as well as the conclusions of hi!'! medical expert, Doctor Robert 
F. Brandmeyer, a member of the psychiatric staff of the 
.) 
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United States Naval Hospital in San Diego, as to his state 
of mind during those critical moments were therefore vital to 
his defense. He contends that the trial judge erroneously 
questioned him and his medical expert ill such an extensive, 
repetitious, and argumentative mauner as to indicate to the 
jury the judge's disbelief that defendant could not remember 
what had happened and that the judge compounded his error 
by failing adequately to charge the jury that they were the 
sole judges of the facts. 
[1] A trial judge may examine witnesses to elicit or 
clarify testimony (People v. Corrigan, 48 Ca1.2d 551, 555 [310 
P.2d 953] ; People v. Ottey, 5 Ca1.2d 714, 721 [56 P.2d 193] ; 
People v. Carlin, 178 Cal.App.2d 705, 714-715 [3 Cal.Rptr. 
301] ; People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [117 P.2d 
437]). [2] Indeed, "it is the right and duty of a judge 
to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be 
established in accordance with the rules of evidence." (People 
v. Corrigan, supra, at p. 559.) [3] The trial judge, how-
ever, must not become an advocate for either party or under 
the guide of examining witnesses comment on the evidence or 
cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness. (People v. Campbell, 
162 Cal.App.2d 776, 787 [329 P.2d 82] ; People v. Lancellotti, 
147 Cal.App.2d 723, 731 [305 P.2d 926) ; People v. Huff, 134 
. Cal.App.2d 182, 187-188 [285 P.2d 17]; People v. Deacon, 
117 Cal.App.2d 206, 209 [255 P.2d 98}.} 
[ 4] Both Penal Code, section 1122, and Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 611, provide that the judge must admonish 
the jury not to form or express any opinions on any subject 
connected with the trial until the case is finally submitted to 
them. A judge must not defeat the purpose of these provi-
sions by comment on the evidence during the trial but must 
also keep an open mind until he has had an opportunity to 
hear all the evidence. [5] Moreover, comment should be 
expressly labeled as the judge's opinion, and the jury advised 
that it may be disregarded; questions are not so labeled, and 
when they convey the judge's opinion of the credibility of a 
witness, there is grave danger not only that they may induce 
the jury to form an opinion before the case is finally sub-
mitted to them, but that the jury will substitute the judge's 
opinion for their own. [6] The judge, therefore, may not 
ask questions to convey to the jury his opinion of the credi-
bility of a witness. (People v. Huff,· 134 Cal.App.2d 182, 188 
[285 P .2d 17).} Nor should he intervene so extensively in 
behalf of the prosecutor as to align himself with the prose-
) 
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cutor in the minds of the jury. (People v. Robinson, 179 Cal. 
App.2d 624, 633-637 [4 CaLRptr. 50].) 
In the present case the trial judge, over defendant's objec-
tion, examined him extensively as to events immediately pre-
ceding the shooting, interrupting the deputy district attor-
ney's cross-examination to do so. The judge questioned de-
fendant closely to clarify inconsistencies between his testi-
mony on the stand and statements he had previously made. 
After defendant was excused as a witness and Doctor Braud-
meyer was about to take the stand, the judge recalled defend-
ant and once again questioned him as to his memory of the 
shooting. After defendant had been excused a second time 
and before Doctor Brandmeyer's examination began, the 
parties retired to chambers for a conference. 
During the conference the judge stated that he did not 
believe defendant's testimony about his lapse of memory and 
that he believed that defendant went to his wife's apartment 
the second time, not to discuss visitation rights, but to fight 
with Brown. The court said: "He didn't think there was 
going to be any discussion ..• I'm not going to swallow 
that at all ...• I'm not going to let the jury swallow it." 
The judge, however, had stated earlier: "It seems to me rather 
strange that this young man can remember up to the point 
where he not only sees a man reach for his hip pocket, but 
after that he reasons in his mind, 'I'm about to be killed unless 
I can act,' and before he can act, he forgets everything. It 
seems to me that was a very convenient time to start suffering 
from amnesia. I am frank to say I don't believe it. I'm not 
trying the facts in this case. The defendant under the consti-
tution is entitled to a jury by twelve people, and they might 
believe it, and if they do believe it, he is entitled to that, and 
I would a whole lot rather one guilty man go free, whether he 
be guilty or not, than I would rather ten guilty men go free 
and one innocent man be convicted, in my book. 
"Now my view is simply this, gentlemen. I will tell you 
that very frankly. I don't think a courtroom is a place to play 
a checker game. I don't think a courtroom is a football con-
test or boxing contest. I don't think the courtroom is a contest 
for the purpose of seeing who is the smarter lawyer, or who 
can persuade the jury best, at all. I think the courtroom is 
a place to see that justice is done, and I think a courtroom is 
a place to bring out all the facts that bear upon the subject, 
and to bring them out fairly and impartially to the end that 
justice may be approximated as closely as may be by the jury. 
Jan. 1961] PEOPLE /'. 1{ rn ':EY 
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That is why I asked this young man some questions to find 
out just at what point he claims he startetl suffering this loss 
of memory and as I havc said, in the abscncc of the jury and 
on this record, I can't quite accept all of his story, but I 
don't know what the jury'8 going to think about it, and I'm 
not going to tell the jury what they ought to think about it. 
I'm going to ask questions as I see fit, to give the jury all the 
light that they can have in order that they may derive,-
arrive at their own opinions .... " 
These statements were made out of the presence of the jury 
and did not induce defendant to abandon any of his defenses. 
Following the confercnce in chambers the judge examined 
Doctor Brandmeyer at great lcngth concerning petitioner's 
alleged retrograde amnesia. Defendant '8 motions for a mis-
trial and a new trial bascd partly on the judge's questioning 
defendant and Doctor Brandmeyer were denied. 
[ 7] .Although the judge questioned defendant and Doctor 
Brandmeyer at great length "The mere fact that the judge 
examined ... at some length does not cstablish misconduct." 
(People v. Corrigan, supra, 48 Ca1.2d 551, 559; People v. 
Montgomery, supra, 47 Ca1.App.2d 1, 18.) 
[ 8] It is ordinarily better practice for a trial judge to 
let counsel develop the case and to nndertake the examination 
of witnesses only when it appears that relevant and material 
testimony will not be elicited by coullsel. (See People v. 
Campbell, 162 Cal..App.2d 776, 787 [329 r.2d 82].) [9] Even 
if the testimony elicited by the judge's questions, however, 
would probably have been elicited by counsel, that fact alone 
does not rendcr the judge's questions improper. 
Defendant contends that the judge's comments in the con-
ference in chambers disclosed his purpose to invade the prov-
ince of the jury by inducing it to disbelieve defendant's evi-
dence about his lapse of memory and that the judge accom-
plished that purpose by improp€'r questioning of defendant 
and Doctor Brandmeyer. 
[10] It is immaterial that the judge did not believe 
defendant's evidence or even that his purpose was to induce 
the jury not to b€'lieve it so long as he sought to accomplish 
that purpose by getting the truth established according to the 
governing rules of law. Certainly there is nothing improper 
in the judge's candidly advising counsel in chambers of his 
disbelief in defendant's evidence. [11] Nor is there any-
thing improper in his qu€'stioning witnesses to induce the 
jury to share that disbelief, if his questions are designed, as 
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the judge stated in the conference in ('hambers, "to bring out 
all the facts that bear upon the suuject, and to uring them out 
fairly and impartially to the end that justice may be approxi-
mated as closely as lllay be by the jury." 
[ 12 ] The questions the jmlge asked defendant were 
designed to distinguish clearly the facts that defendant re-
membered and the facts that he did not remember and to 
clarify the inconsistencies between his testimony and his pre-
vious statement to his naval superiors. The questions the judge 
asked Doctor Brandmeyer were designed to ge.t a full explana- ! 
tion of the nature and causes of retrograde amnesia. A care-
ful examination of the record convinces us that the judge's 
questions were not a guise for conveying to the jury the 
court's disbelief in defendant's evidence but were asked to 
get the truth established, and that they fairly and impartially 
brought out relevant and material testimony. Moreover, the 
judge instructed the jury that any intimation in his questions 
or the questions of counsel that certain facts were or were not 
true must be disregarded, and he adequately instructed thcm 
that they were the exclusive judges of the effect and value of 
the evidence. . 
Defendant also contends that the court erred in curtailing 
the voir dire examination of the jurors, The court con-
ducted an elaborate voir dire examination and then allowed 
each party to examine the prospective jurors, Defense couusel 
attempted to ask the jurors the branch of military service 
with which they had been affiliated, whether the juror would 
be prejudiced by reason of the fact that there was a "divorce 
in this case," and whether any of the jurors were related to 
a law enforcement officer. 
The court refused to permit these questions on the ground 
that they were asked to obtain information for peremptory 
challenges. [ 13 ] "It is now well settled in this state that 
a juror may not be examined on voir dire solely for the 
purpose of laying the foundation for the exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge." (People v. Ferl1'n, 203 Cal. 587, 598 [265 
P. 230].) [ 14] If special circumstances in the present case 
made defendant's questions relevant to show bias or other 
grounds for a challenge for cause he should have informed 
the court of his reasons for asking the questions, (People v. 
Hinshaw,40 Cal.App. 672, 674 [182 p, 59].) 
[15] Defendant contends that the court erroneously ruled 
out of order a question designed to establish that after de-
fendant's first visit Brown stated: "[i]f Rigs comes back 
) 
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I'll tear him apart." It is conceded that defendant did 
not hear this threat. At the time the question was asked 
there was no evidence ill the record that Brown may have 
been the aggressor or that defendant was aeting ill self-defense. 
Evidenee of an uncollullunicateu threat is proper only after 
a foundation has bcen laid tending to show that the victim 
was the aggl'cssor. (People v. Spraic, 87 Cal.App. 724, 729-730 
[262 P. 795] ; see 1 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.] 552.) The 
question was not reaskedafter such foundation had been laid. 
[16] Defendant contends that the court erred in ruling 
out of order a question designed to elicit Brown's tone of 
voice when he statcd that he was coming out to see defendant. 
After the question was asked the court stated that Brown's 
tone of voice was irrelevant, but the answer to the question, 
that Brown's tone was" harsh," was not struck and remained 
in the record for the jury's consideration. 
[17] Defendant objects to the court's instruction that 
after an interlocutory divorce" [neither spouse] without con-
sent of the other may legally iuvade the other's separate home, 
nor eject a guest thercfrom, nor exercise any dominion over 
it. The fact that olle of the spouses is given the right of 
visitation with a child in thc custody of the other does not 
affect the rule just stated." 
The correctness of the instruction is not disputed. De-
fendantinsists, however, that in view of the refusal to in-
struct that defendant had a right to visit his child, the instruc-
tion may have misled the jury into believing that defendant's 
conduct in approaching llis ,,,,ife's apartment was unlawful 
as a matter of law. 
There was evidence that defendant contemplated the use 
of force to visit his child. The court, therefore, properly 
instructed the jury that defendant did 110t have the right to 
use force. Defendant's proposed instruction stated that de-
fendant had a right to visit his child, but failed to state that 
he could not use force to do so, and was therefore properly 
refused. 
[18] After deliberating for some time, the jury requested 
further instructions on intent and transfer of intent. The 
court repeated the instructions on transferred intent and 
gave examples illustrating the application of the rules, In 
the examples the court used itself and members of the jury 
as parties, The fOt'eman th(>n imlicah'll that he Ullllerstooll 
the instructions uut that he was not certain how to apply 
them to the prescnt l'nse. The court replicd that the ap-
) 
) 
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plication of the law to the facts was the province of the jury. 
There is no merit in defendant's contention that the court 
erred in using examples in which members of the jury were 
parties and in referring to the foreman as "My frknd. " Dc· 
fendant also contends that the court erred in repeating the 
instructions on transferred intent only and failing to repeat 
the instructions on intent, on the ground that this failure may 
have been interpreted by the jury as a mandate to find intent 
and transfer it. This contention is without merit. The 
court's earlier instructions fully and adequately instructed 
the jury on the law of intent and the foreman indicated that 
the repeated instructions answered the question asked by 
the jury. The court's duty is fully performed if the addi· 
tional instructions answer the question of the jury. (People 
v. Finali, 31 Cal.App. 479, 489 [160 P. 850] ; ct. Olson v. 
Standard Marine Ins. Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 130, 140-141 [240 
P.2d 379].) 
[19] The court instructed the jury to return to court 
when it had arrived at a verdict on any of the three counts. 
The jury first returned a verdict finding defendant guilty 
of assault against Mrs. Rigney and Sharon Brown. The 
jury then returned to the jury room and found defendant 
guilty of assault with intent to kill Brown. Defendant 
did not object to this procedure when the court first sug-
gested it. In his motion for a new trial and on appeal he 
contends that under Penal Code, section 1164, the jury must 
be discharged after any verdict has been announced. Section 
1164 provides: 
"When the verdict given is such as the court may receive, 
the clerk, or if there is no clerk, the judge or justice, must 
record it in full upon the minutes, and if requested by any 
party must read it to the jury, and inquire of them whether 
it is their verdict. If any juror disagrees, the fact must be 
entered upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but 
if no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and 
the jury must be discharged from the case." 
This section does not preclude the jury's making a separate 
return of its verdict on each count when more than one count 
is charged. Penal Code, section 954, expressly vests in the 
court the power to have separate courtts tried separately. 
There is no reason why the court should not have the jury's 
verdicts on each count returnt'd separately. Such procedure 
is followed in the federal courts. (See United States v. Cotter, 
60 F.2d 689, 690·691.) In New York, which has a statute 
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identical with Penal COile. s(,ction 1164 (New York Code 
of Criminal Pl'ol'ellure, § 451), verdicts lllay be reLurned 
separately ,,,hen lllore than one defendant is 011 tt·ial. (People 
v. Cohen, 223 N.Y. 406 [lU) N.E. 886, 893-894].) 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., 
concurred. 
Schaner, J., concurred in the judgment. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the record in this 
case demonstrates that the trial judge aligned himself with 
the prosecution by assumillg the role of prosecutor, and clearly 
indicated to the jury his disbelief in the main defense of the 
defendant. The two witnesses were constantly interrupted 
by the trial judge, who then exhanstively, argumentatively 
and repetitiously examined them almost to the complete ex-
clusion of the district attorney. Such examination was of-
ficious and unnecessary. It necessarily deprived the defendant 
of that fair and impartial trial guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution of this state and of the United States. 
The majority opinion correctly and fairly states the facts. 
It also sets forth the general principles applicable to the 
examination of witnesses by the trial judge, and briefly 
mentions the limitations on that power. The majority opinion 
correctly points out that while a trial judge, in a criminal 
case, has the power and duty to elicit and to elarify the testi-
mony he "must not become an advocate for either party or 
under the guise of examining witnesses comment on the evi-
dence or cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness." It is also 
pointed out that comment on the evidence in the guise of 
questions should not be indulged in during trial, and that 
the trial judge may not, properly, ask questions casting 
aspersions on the eredibility of any witness. It is also the 
law that the trial judge should not, by his questions, distort 
the testimony nor engage in partisan advocacy. 
In my opinion the record demonstrates that all of these 
rules were violated. The record shows that defendant's de-
fense was that he acted in self-defense up to a point, and 
that he then suffered a loss of memory. After the defendant 
testified as to the claimed loss of memory, and while the 
prosecutor was cross-examining, the judge simply took over 
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that cross-examination. His questions covered the pertinent 
periods time and time again, and embraced much of the ma-
terial already brought out by thc prosecution. After the 
prosecutor had concluded his examination, the judge took 
over again, and again covered the same field that he had 
already covered at great length. After the defendant had 
been removed from the stand the judge recalled him and again 
subjected him to a grueling cross-examination. All objec-
tions by defense counsel to these tactics were overruled. The 
questions were partisan, repetitive and argumentative, and 
some of them ridiculed the witness. 
So far as the conference in chambers is concerned, at which 
defendant and his counsel were, of course, present, the sole 
question involved was whether Doctor Brandmeyer could give 
his opinion as to whether defendant was suffering from retro-
grade amnesia. After properly ruling that the doctor could 
testify on the subject, the trial judge then took 38 pages of 
the transcript to lecture the defendant and his counsel on how 
ridiculous he thought this defense was. Whether intended as 
such or not, such tactics could not fail to intimidate the 
defendant and his counsel. 
After this colloquy in chambers Doctor Brandmeyer was 
called to the stand. The doctor, who was a reputable navy 
psychiatrist, was defendant's chief witness. The court was 
sarcastic and unfair to this witness. Even during his direct 
examination the trial judge took over and asked questions 
permissible only as cross-examination. If the prosecutor had 
thus interrupted defense counsel it would have been error, 
and it was equally wrong for the trial judge to have used such 
tactics. The record shows that the judge simply took over the 
cross-examination of this key witness. When the defense took 
the doctor on redirect to try to repair the damage caused by 
the judge's questions, as soon as the doctor gave an opinion 
favorable to the defense, the judge broke in and cross-examined 
in a fashion so as to ridicule that opinion. . 
Undoubtedly the trial judge tried to be fair, and undoubt-
edly his motives were of the best, but his examination of these 
witnesses was such that it ridiculed the defendant's defense, 
and obviously was aimed at inducing the jury to disbelieve 
that testimony. This was prejudicial. These errors clearly 
denied defendant the fair trial to which he was entitled. I 
would reverse the judgment. 
